Who is “Big Brother”?
|“As governmental failures came to be more widely acknowledged, personal respect for law deteriorated. Politics and politicians became more blatantly profit-seeking… As the federal courts were seen to make law in their own idealized image, by natural extension individuals came to think of their own private criteria to discriminating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ law.”By James M. Buchanan
The Limits of Liberty: Between Liberty and Leviathan
Chapter 10, pp. 172-3
(The University of Chicago Press, 1975)
The Judicial System of the Russian Federation was reformed and reorganized in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993). The framework of the Court System as prescribed in the Constitution was created using the basic framework of the existing system used in the United States of America. This fact is not surprising since it was the intention of the newly formed Russian Leadership to quickly establish the Russian Federation as a strong stable Global Democracy and what better example to duplicate than the leading Global Democracy, America. Russia was to become a Democracy that would soon join the World Trade Organization and be respected around the world as a good investment climate to foreign countries, MNC’s and non-state actors/investors.
This legitimacy was extremely important to the new government leadership since they were also the new oligarchy that controlled most of Russian industry, something they accomplished in a short period of two years through a swiftly enacted rule of Privatization. These politically aligned oligarchs new that they must have the support of a working Judicial System to protect their enormous new wealth.
Between 1993 and today, Russia has failed to be accepted into the WTO and continues to suffer from a non-working Judicial System. Certainly the system exists but as I will discuss in this paper, it lacks the ability to protect the innocent due to extreme corruption at all levels of the Court. During the last 10 years, the names of the Oligarchy have changed, but their original goal to legitimize the system to protect their riches, has failed due to their own controversial and mostly counterproductive influence and corrupt business practices.
I will discuss and analyze two cases studies from two very different perspectives. The first case involves a court dispute that took place in 1992, less than one year after the collapse of the Soviet Union and one year before the adoption of the Russian Federal Constitution. This court dispute took place outside of the official Russian Judicial System under the direct organization of the St. Petersburg (Russia) Mafia, known as “The Mafia Court”. The second case study is of a recent event that started in August 2002 with the leader of the Russian pulp and paper industry, Ilim Pulp Enterprises.
Case Study I: OAO “Russkij Les” vs. L&S Trading Inc.
In response to an earlier draft of this section my Russian Embassy source told me that this Part is entertaining and looks very much like the scenes from “The Godfather”. He noted that history repeats itself and that my comments were absolutely on target. The situation I am about to describe is a direct result of the inability of the legal system to enforce its rulings. After exhaustive research I have not been able to find any published materials about Mafia Tribunals or Mafia Court. No one can actually confirm or deny the existence of either of these phenomena except those that have been party to either of them. I therefore admit that what I will discuss in this Part is from my own personal experience having participated in two mafia tribunals and having been refused an opportunity to participate in Mafia Court.
I was a businessman living and working in St. Petersburg, Russia between 1990 and 2000. In the early 90’s soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even before the official establishment of the Federal Constitution Law on Judicial System of the Russian Federation (Dec 1996) there were arbitration courts but these courts had no means to enforce decisions. For this reason the courts were not very busy. The main reasons people used courts in the early 90’s were to get decisions on subjects directly related to legal issues where the Government was somehow involved. Where the courts were not used were for arguments between commercial entities. The only place commercial entities could argue against each other with a remote chance of collecting damages, were Mafia Tribunals. Having had a Russian partner with admitted ties to the Mafia of the early 90’s I found myself in my first tribunal in early 1992.
Soon after we started our timber export business (L&S Trading Inc.) Leonid, my former Russian partner, informed me that we were summoned to appear at a Mafia Tribunal that took place in the coffee shop of the Pulkovskaya Hotel in St. Petersburg, not too far from the Pulkovo International Airport. It was common practice for Mafia to meet at hotels in open view to public and the local police. The truth is that they felt it was less likely that someone would try to kill them in public near tourists. This would change in later years with a number of assassinations taking place in the coffee shop of the Sheraton Nevsky Palace Hotel on Nevsky Prospekt in downtown St. Petersburg.
One of Leonid’s suppliers (Russkij Les) accused him of not paying full price on a shipment he made to one of our buyers. Leonid obtained an old acquaintance of his whom he knew for many years that represented us. Prior to our arrival at the hotel we met in two separate locations in the backs of apartment complexes to meet the necessary people who would be a part of this meeting. Only after the 2nd rendezvous did we know where the actual meeting would take place. We then found ourselves at the Hotel.
As we walked into the restaurant we saw at least 30 Mafia seated in the cramped area of 100 sq. ft. with three distinct groups within the overall group. The least important were the plaintiff and the defendants. Most important were our “attorneys”. The third group was their bodyguards who were sitting further away from the table watching everyone else who passed near to us. I cannot imagine that any of the tourists visiting the café had any idea of who these people were.
The tribunal lasted approximately 2 hours. We were victorious at the tribunal and received certain compensations, which were settled with Leonid. The Mafia attorney for the plaintiff (our accusers) was named “Slava” who in fact was the 2nd most powerful Mafia boss in the City. The “judge” was dressed in a Nike sweat suit and was apparently the Godfather of the St. Petersburg Mafia. Sweat suits were a very common form of dress for the Mafia in those days. Later that year he was shot 10 times but survived the assassination attempt and moved to Germany.
The Mafia Tribunals of the early 90’s have evolved into modern day Mafia Courts, which follow a very stringent set of rules. For example you cannot apply to the Mafia Court until after you have already gone through the official Russian Arbitration Courts. You may ask, “If I have already gone through Arbitration Court, why do I need Mafia Court?” The answer to this question is the very reason why Mafia Court is so important and in fact a sought after and busy court system in today’s Russia. Sought after by Russian businessmen, not foreigners. The main problem associated with Arbitration Court is that if you win a settlement involving money you have no means to collect it. The Russian Court does not have a working collection system or a “Sheriff’s Department” who is available to insure that the winner can collect from the loser. There are no police you can turn to or any banks that will take a decision of the Arbitration Court seriously. Most foreign companies who go to Arbitration Court end up winning, but not collecting the judgments made by the courts. In effect they are really the big “losers” because they will not allow themselves to take the next step – Mafia Court. Their western values tell them that any association with “Mafia” is not acceptable. To ignore this is my justification that foreign companies should not be in Russia in the first place, if they are not willing to play the game the way it is designed. The “winners” are the Russian enterprises that leave the arbitration court with smiles on their faces knowing their foreign adversaries will never take the next step. As a leading consultant to foreign companies wishing to venture into the wild new Russian Federation I frequently recommended they not do so. In response to the question “Should we invest in Russia” I replied that if they were interested in investing time and money to sell their products to Russia or to purchase Russian products for exports then invariably my answer was “Yes.” If they were interested in establishing joint ventures then my answer was always “No.” This attitude did not change through the period until I departed Russia in mid-2000. Following a second Mafia Tribunal in early 1994 we reestablished our trading company with silent (Government) partners who insured that we would not find ourselves in further predicaments. As it turned out, my partner embezzled moneys from our company and the company was closed in early 1995.
Case Study II: Base Element vs. ZAO “Ilim Pulp Enterprises”
If you listen to the Russian news services in both the major cities of the Russian Federation you will read about assets being frozen in banks as results of court rulings and bailiffs, supported by police appearing at factories to allow access by new management after hostile takeovers. The most common problems with the Russian Arbitration System remain that competing sides frequently manage to obtain contradicting decisions from two different courts and the judicial process gets stuck. But these are only my own observations. The road to perfection is a long one. The police supports Court decisions but this does not guarantee the fulfillment of justice. The issue is more than just applying force; it is a problem of creating a “Rule of Law” culture in the business community and the society as a whole. Unless the majority of businesses learn to respect the rules of the court, the system will not work, regardless of how you support its rulings.
In comparison, the US Arbitration Court system would collapse if most decisions were opposed by the losing sides, sides willing to go as afar as it takes to have the decisions reversed, instigating blockades at entrances to factories, bribery of local politicians and finally contract hits by the Mafia. In retrospect it is an evolutionary process. With step-by-step reforms and more important education to the masses things will change in the right direction.
ZAO “Ilim Pulp Enterprises”, established in St. Petersburg in 1992 found itself under siege in April 2002, ten long years after it’s founding by Zahar Smushkin, an American educated Russian entrepreneur in the Russian Pulp, Paper and Timber Industry. In a span of 10 years, Ilim Pulp had purchased recently privatized mills including Bratsk Forest Complex (the largest producer of timber products in the Russian Federation), Kotlass Pulp & Paper Mill (the largest pulp & paper producer in Russia and Ustilimsk Pulp Mill. Collectively Ilim Pulp controlled the Russian pulp production market and by 2002 they were close to a USD1 Billion revenue company with a 30% profit margin.
The case of Ilim Pulp is a very good example of modern day Russian corporate takeovers. In this case the adversary is Oleg Deripaska, one of the richest oligarchs in the country. No one knew who he was 3 years ago but now married to the niece of the former President, Boris Yeltsin, he has quickly amassed support to create an enormous conglomerate. By the time this saga in Russia corporate history is complete Mr. Deripaska may no longer be who he is today. However, I would expect that Mr. Smushkin would survive the ordeal he is under since he has the apparent support of the President, Vladimir Putin.
A former minority partner of Mr. Smushkin (Smushkin reportedly owns 85% of the company) Vladimir Kogan and his “Banking House St. Petersburg” came together with Mr. Deripaska’s holding company “Base Element” and small investment company “Continental Management” and plotted how they can obtain controlling shares in Ilim Pulp Enterprises. Mr. Deripaska had already successfully taken control of the Russian Aluminum and metals markets and was now ready to enter the extremely valuable forestry and timber sectors of the growing economy. By the time he had seized shares in Kotlass Mill he had already taken control of the Bratsk Forest Complex in Siberia, also a holding of Ilim Pulp.
According to claims by Deripaska’s representatives, Ilim Pulp did not live up to its financial commitments that it supposedly agreed to when it purchased its assets thru Privatization. Deripaska found a small shareholder (although it has not been proven that this person owns actual shares of the company) 2,000 miles away from Koryazhma in a town called Kemerovo in Siberia. Deripaska convinced a local court judge to declare that Ilim Pulp no longer had legal rights to their assets and 61% of the shares in Ilim Pulp were released to the Russian Federal Property Fund and immediately sold off to Deripaska’s Investment company for USD100 million, 16% of the total value of the shares. Through this entire process Ilim Pulp insisted they had never been informed of the case before the local Kemerovo Court and would not accept what they deemed an illegal seizure of their enterprise.
As of October 21, 2002 Ilim has convinced a District Court to overturn the decisions of the lower court in Kemerovo and a new hearing is rescheduled for November 4, 2002. (As I will be writing this paper as the saga continues I will continue to update the story).
Part II: Who is Big Brother?
After reviewing various scholarly works regarding property rights, contract law, international relations and especially works on Russia, I have chosen to analyze my two case studies exclusively using The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan by James Buchanan (The University of Chicago press, 1975). Although this book comprises 10 chapters I will devote by analysis entirely to Chapter 8: The Punishment Dilemma (pp. 130 – 146).
The Limits of Liberty analyzes the United States as it was in the 60’s – 70’s. The Russian Judicial System is not discussed in this book at anytime yet his discussions in these short 35 pages have shown be what I believe to be the answer to why the Russian Judiciary does not work, cannot work and will not work for decades to come (…or does it?). In short, my analysis validates the important of the Mafia Court System as well as support why Deripaska assumed he could takeover Ilim Pulp Enterprises. If he eventually succeeds in his quest, which can only happen following the published date of this paper, it will happen because the court system does not work.
q Buchanan contends that the enforcement of law must be dictated by an internal source or internal peacemaker versus an external third party as suggested by Thomas Hobbes theory of Anarchy more than 300 years ago.
Mafia Court is an example of Hobbessian theory, an anarchic theory of justice. As I have suggested various times in this paper, the judicial system does not work, a system relative to Buchanan’s Keynesian ideology.
Deripaska vs. Smushkin is in a court battle using the Keynesian court system of Russia. If the court is fair, which it cannot be, then this argument should be resolved between both parties with the assistance of the arbitration court judiciary.
q Buchanan discusses “public good” versus “public bad” in terms of utility costs. What is good for the public means lower costs whereas public bad is more expensive for society. Public good finds a way to deter crime or not punish violators. To punish violators of crime means financing police, courts and penal institutions requiring great expense and which in turn is bad economics for the society.
Mafia Court, I contend, is “public good” because it is outside of the legal system. There is no direct influence on the public economically. The Mafia Court does not utilize or require a police force, court building (a hotel bar will suffice) or penal institutions since both parties agree to resolve their dispute at the time of the tribunal of court proceeding.
Although Case #2 will most likely not require penal institutions for either party it will entail many court hearings and extensive travel for the parties involved. The cost of the security forces of both parties, public relations, lawyers (advocates) will eventually cost both parties and the public millions of dollars in expenses. This case will be drawn out over a long period of time because the court system they are utilizing cannot come up with a judgment either side will respect or accept. Because the Kotlass Mill has ceased functions due to this takeover attempt the workers of the mill with lose salaries contributing to an increasing “public bad”.
q “Those who violate law see immediate gain; they try to compare the expected value of this gain against the expected and future costs that punishment involves. A decision to break law represents a trade-off between anticipated future loss and present gain.” (Ch. 8, p. 135)
As I read this statement I began to understand that Buchanan was about to tell me the answer I have tried to identify for the last two years. Russian criminals choose to break laws because they know that the immediate gain far outweighs the possible future losses, assuming they ever get caught. Something they do not anticipate will happen. Since there is no sure method of enforcing court decisions most law-breakers are not afraid of the system. If Deripaska and Smushkin accept the decision of the Russian court there will certainly be a big loser, if Smushkin is the loser. The aggressor in this case, the party that started the attempted takeover has nothing to lose which legitimizes his pursuit to obtain Ilim Pulp Enterprises as another feather in his hat. Without question Deripaska only has potential gain.
q Buchanan discussed the important of establishing punishments and their enforcements when the law is determined when the constitution is determined, prior to when the law is broken. The alternative, he mentions, is dictating punishments “ex-ante”, post-constitutional. He brings this ideology forward using his theory of the “hard man” versus the “soft man”. The hard man is more likely to establish strict punishments before laws are broken because he believes in retribution by lawbreakers. The soft man, on the other hand, is reluctant to push forth-early rules and regulations because he believes that he may one day become the potentially accused. Should this happen, he does not want to be victimized by a strict ruling he created at an earlier date.
I see the Mafia Court as the bard man even though I see individual Mafioso as the soft man. The Mafia Court believes in strict retribution because their underlying rule for existence is that the losing party must pay them the equal value that they must pay to the winning side. There are always two winners in Mafia Court: the winning party and the Court itself.
In the case of Deripaska and Smushkin both are “soft”. They both manipulated privatization to gain their riches. In my judgment neither side deserves to have their wealth or assets. Since Smushkin is far smaller than Deripaska in assets and wealth he might now think that he would be better off if the system were stronger and that the laws and enforcement were put into place in a constitutional timeframe versus post-constitutional.
q “To the extent that potential law violators predict with certainty that they will be subjected to punishment, the severity of the punishment itself may be reduced and vice a versa.” (Ch. 8, p. 139)
In the official court there are no severe punishments pre-established for crimes committed (I will discuss this more in my conclusion). The reasons for this are two-fold. A severe punishment would be a public bad, something the Russian court cannot afford. The second reason is that the Department of Bailiffs cannot enforce severe punishments due to lack of funding and personnel. In Mafia Court the accuser suggest the punishment. It is usually not server since the decision can be turned against them. As much as they want to win, they also do not want to lose. The cost of losing in Mafia Court far outweighs the cost of winning. As suggested earlier the court dictates the severity of punishment since they re a guaranteed winner regardless of the outcome.
In the case of Deripaska and Smushkin this argument is not very clear. The court decision will reflect whether or not Deripaska is right or wrong. If he is wrong he walks away and keeps his prior holdings. Smushkin is clearly the only possible victim since a loss world cost him a 1 billion dollar enterprise and more than a decade’s amount of work. Smushkin, unlike Deripaska, is not an oligarch. He has only the one business, Ilim Pulp Enterprises. He was not part of the government that wrote the 1993 Constitution nor is he related to the current government elite. Deripaska was an unknown in 1993 but his assets are clearly as result of political maneuvers and the fact that his wife is related to the former President of the country; the same president who create and signed the 1993 Constitution into law. If we were to consider that Deripaska is in fact the government elite then he is pursuing Ilim Pulp using a system he in fact created.
When I finished reading this chapter I sat back in my chair and I felt as if an enormous burden was lifted from my shoulders. The points discussed were not new to me but in reading Buchanan’s analysis, everything seemed to come into focus and I instantly came to my own realization that everything now made complete sense.
I entered the Russian market with vast international experience but with no understanding of the Russians. When I left Russia 10 years later I thought I new more than most foreigners. Now I can feel that I can offer you, the reader my new clear understanding of the most basic underlying reason why crime and punishment are the current and future lifestyle of the Russian Federation. Although my theory exemplifies Russia, it can be applied to any other society around the globe. I must admit that in the context of his discussions using the US as his topic that I do not agree that his theories were correct about the USA. However, had he been writing about Russia I would agree completely and to pay him homage for his brilliance. I do pay homage to James Buchanan and profoundly offer him my gratitude and thanks for this enlightenment.
Russia has existed for more than a millennium and its people are a result of more than 50 generations. They have lived through autonomies, royalty, communism and now a form of democracy but for all intensive reasons I consider that the leadership of the current Russia are misbehaved children, children who lack strict parental guidance.
The 1993 Constitution in its entirety was created and adopted for the benefit of foreigner’s beliefs in the new Russia. The new government, under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was meant to be a lose, non-regulated society which would evolve according to he personal whims of it’s leaders. I considered using the term “control” versus leadership but I cannot say that the current President has controls since he appeared from nowhere to become President. Much like Deripaska, someone brought both Putin and Deripaska to power. This same “someone” or group of people may have also given Yeltsin his power. This question is the basis for another research project of the future. For the purposes of my conclusion I will refer to this “someone” as “Big Brother”.
The Russian Judicial System is the only law enforcement body in the Russian Federation. It is responsible for managing the law and formulating and instituting punishments for those that break the laws. This system fails in many respects:
- There are no clear definitions of what the laws are.
- There is not punishment agency capable of enforcing decisions of the courts, when they do have them.
- Every level of the judiciary is overworked, underpaid and suggestively corrupt.
It is actually a perfect working system. It works exactly the way “Big Brother” wants it to. It does not work for victims but it was not designed to.
In mid-1995 my secretary was arrested and incarcerated for 30 days in the main city jail in St. Petersburg. My partner was arrested and incarcerated one week later and spent a total of 45 days in prison. In both cases, neither was charged with a crime. They were guilty of what they were arrested for, signing a contract with a Moscow based vodka distributor using a false company as the buyer. They took delivery of the vodka, sold him but never actually paid for it. Had the court actually charged them with the crime, which would have been very easy to do since all the evidence was clearly against them, they would have had to appear in court and then sent to prison for a cost to the Court System. The idea of arresting both of them had nothing to do with why they were detained in the first place. They wanted to get them off the street into a secured location where they could question them about something entirely different. They had knowledge the system wanted to know. Rather than take a chance they would flee the city they detained them so they could question them.
In the 1990’s police regularly arrested people and incarcerated them for long period of time without charging them with crimes. Unless I am mistaken I believe they are allowed to keep someone as many as 30 days without charging them. There have been high profile cases however where people have been detained for years without being charged. This suggests to me that the Court is not designed to protect the rights of citizens but rather that if functions for the interest of “Big Brother” and members of his elite family.
If Big Brother allowed the Judiciary to work as the Constitution suggests it should, with a clear set of punishments in place, Big Brother would find most of his family in prison, including himself (or herself). Since this is the last thing he/she would want the court has not been given the autonomy and instructions it was designed to have, at least according to a democratized society. Since the system does not work against organized crime much like it does not work against corrupt politicos this would further suggest that Big Brother is the leader not only of the government elite but also the criminal establishment within the Russian society.
If I were to now analyze the judiciary under the former Soviet Union I would come to the solution that the current system is anarchic in comparison to the communist system. The current system allows greater freedom for the ruling class/elite and for those members of society under their protection. As the court protects the elite in also protects the criminal element, the mafia. Immediate gain far outweighs the cost of punishment for every major political figure in Russia as long as they are looked upon favorably. Reading the newspapers over the last 10 years there have been many murders of elite that have fallen out of favor. Rather than go to the cost of bringing them to court it seems as though justice by the bullet is easier and far less expensive for the State.
The current President has announced many reforms since assuming office but none of these reforms have amounted to an increase in arrests and punishments. They have not sufficiently deterred crime since they are both post-constitutional and limited in scope. The Russian elite is relatively young. It is my best guess that “Big Brother” (possibly Big Sister) is older and I believe this person has already picked a successor. The only way the current corruption will change is if an internal element within Russian society has the power to unseat “Big Brother” and his henchmen. Until this happens, nothing will change.
Russkij Les vs. L&S Trading
- “Murder without Prosecution” (Steven Douglas, Autobiography in process)
- Various interviews with an anonymous source at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC
Base Element vs. Ilim Pulp Enterprises
- “Consolidation of Industrial Empires Reshaping Russian Economy” (Sabrina Tavernise, The New York Times, August 13, 2002)
- “FSC Accuses Ilim of Black PR Campaign” (Torrey Clark, Moscow Times, August 15, 2002)
- “Pulp Mill Fight Shows the Dangers of Success in Russia” (Geoffrey T Smith, Dow Jones Newswires, August 12, 2002)
- “Competition, Russian – Style at Disputed Kotlass Mill, Corporate Fighting is Bare Knuckle” (Guy Chazan, The Wall Street Journal Europe, August 12, 2002)
- “The Kotlass paper wars at Koryazhma” (Lucas Romriell, The Russian Journal, August 2002?)
- “Base Element Condemns Illegal Occupation of Russian Pulp & Paper Plant (PRNewswires, Moscow, August 9, 2002)
- “Ilim Pulp Reports favorable court decisions at heart of attempted hostile takeover” (PRNewswires, St. Petersburg, August20, 2002)
- “Base Element lobs accusations of a cover-up into Ilim Pulp Enterprises’ court battle for Kotlass” (PRNewswires, Moscow, August 28, 2002)
- “Court postpones decision on hostile takeover of Ilim Pulp” (PRNewswires, St. Petersburg, October 7, 2002)
- “Russia’s Ilim Pulp wins court ruling in takeover defense” (PRNewswires, St. Petersburg, October 21, 2002)
- “Zakhar Smushkin: we will not post our armed forces” by S. Novolobskaya (Russian Pulp, Paper and Board Magazine, October 2002 Issue)
- Various interviews with an anonymous source at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC
Part II: Big Brother
- The Limits of Liberty: Between Liberty and Leviathan by James M Buchanan (The University of Chicago Press, 1975)
- 2. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism by Vadim Volkov (Cornell University Press, 2002)
- 3. After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place As a Great Power by Dimitri K. Simes (Simon & Schuster, 1999)
- 4. How to Profit from the Coming Russian Boom: The Insider’s Guide to Business Opportunities and Survival on the Frontiers of Capitalism by R. Poe (McGraw Hill, 1993)
- 5. From Nyet to Da: Understanding the Russians by Yale Richmond (Intercultural Press Inc, 1996)
- 6. The Oligarchs – Wealth and Power in the New Russia by David E Hoffman (Public Affairs, 2002)
- 7. The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy by Federico Varese (Oxford University Press, 2001)
- 8. Russian Etiquette and Ethics in Business by Lloyd Donaldson (NTC Publishing, 1995) Russian Business Relationships in the Wake of Reform by Noreena Hertz (St. Martin’s Press, 1997)
- 9. Bandits, Gangsters and the Mafia: Russia, The Baltic States and the CIS since 1992 by Martin McCauley (Pearson Education Limited, 2001)
10. Doing Business in Russia: Basic Facts by Tankred G. Golenpolsky, Robert M. Johnstone, Vladimir A Kashin (The Oasis Press, 1995)
11. Rebirth of a Nation: An Anatomy of Russia by John Lloyd (Michael Joseph Limited, 1998).
12. Various interviews with an anonymous source at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC
- The Introduction (thecrooner.wordpress.com)
- My First Visit to the Soviet Union (stevenleesdouglas.wordpress.com)
- KGB Interrogation in St. Petersburg (stevenleesdouglas.wordpress.com)
- An Investigation into Russian Human Trafficking (sldouglas.wordpress.com)
- An Investigation into Modern Religious White Slavery in the USA (sldouglas.wordpress.com)
- Newborn justice: Russian Constitutional Court celebrates anniversary (rt.com)
- Chapter 12: Business, Mafia and Jazz (thecrooner.wordpress.com)
- Tajik president ordered to free jailed Russian pilot (rt.com)
- How can a common US citizen defend and protect himself in today’s judicial system when mistakenly accused of crimes (wiki.answers.com)
- US puts up $5 mln for info on Russia most wanted (rt.com)
- Well that can’t be good. (doubleplusundead.com)
- Billionaire battle: Russians take feud to UK court (seattletimes.nwsource.com)
- Billionaire battle: Russians take feud to UK court (seattlepi.com)
- Chechen David vs. Russian Goliath (russianloyola.wordpress.com)
- Rivlin May Stop Pro-Democracy Bill on Judicial System (israelnationalnews.com)